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INTRODUCTION 
This working paper addresses several issues in South African law 
relevant to determining whether and to what extent regulations may 
address genuine problems in the Copyright Amendment Bill [CAB].  
Regulations are of course not yet drafted for this Bill and the Bill remains 
a Bill and is not yet an Act.  Indeed, as discussed further below, the Bill 
is currently under consideration in Parliament as part of a section 79 
process.  In addition to its focus on the CAB, this paper identifies a set of 
emerging South African public law issues associated with similarly 
situated legislation.  
After a background section that places the CAB within the currently 
ongoing joint process between Parliament and President and outlines the 
three constitutional reservations to the CAB raised by the President 
(section one), this working paper addresses the boundaries on regulations 
and the potential role regulations to the CAB can play in three parts:  
constitutional issues (section two), new public law issues (section three), 
and accepted principles and parameters for drafting regulations in South 
Africa (section four).   
In section five, more specific questions and issues regarding the CAB 
are discussed.  These include the question of whether the regulations can 
add new definitions of terms (e.g. to the definition of performers to 
exclude extras) as well as some specific issues raised with respect to the 
bill by informed critics, such as how the bill (particularly section 22(3)) 
might be read to apply retroactively and the degree to which the royalty 
rights in the bill (section 6A, et seq.) and reversion rights may be assigned 
through contract.  This working paper does not give a view on how to 
resolve legitimate problems, but rather outlines options available to 
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address such problems in regulations – arguing that such options do exist 
in regulatory drafting, both in the current period of section 79 
consideration of the Bill and, assuming the Bill is enacted in at least 
roughly similar form, in the period between its enactment and its being 
brought into force.  Regulations can play a potential significant and 
constructive role in both these periods in addressing genuine 
constitutional issues. 
 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE POTENTIAL ENACTMENT OF THE COPYRIGHT 
AMENDMENT BILL, 2017 
Conducting litigation or engaging in other legal efforts such as the 
drafting of regulations may be likened to the production of a film.  In such 
terms, the movie pitched and analyzed in this working paper is the 
drafting of the regulations to the not-yet-enacted CAB (B13B-2017), 
which is in front of the President of the Republic of South Africa. 
There were at least three movies made prior to the one being pitched 
below – one could even term the drafting of regulations a sequel.  The 
first movie consists of the production of the currently valid law, the 
Copyright Act, 98 of 1978.  This Act followed those of 1916 and of 1965 
(Act 63 of 1965).  The 1978 Act has largely been administered by the 
Department of Trade and Industry [dti].2  Part of its administration 
currently falls under the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission, an agency created in the 2008 Companies Act reform 
process (replacing another 1978 piece of legislation, the Companies Act).  
For enforcement, a High Court judge currently sits as the Copyright 
Tribunal and hears licensing disputes.3 
The second movie consists of the drafting and passage of the CAB, 
2017.  This production took place from at least 2015 and has been shot 
mostly in Parliament, concluding with National Council of Provinces 
passage on 29 March 2019.  There were plenty of points of drama in this 
production. 
The third movie – and one that is still playing – is the enactment 
process of the CAB.  One might of course consider this to be part and 
parcel of the drafting and passage of the CAB, but it appears to warrant 
separate billing and treatment.  In order to be enacted, the CAB needs to 
be signed into law by the President in terms of section 79 of the 
Constitution.  This section provides an opportunity for the President to 
surface serious doubts (“reservations”) concerning the constitutionality 
of the draft legislation if he has them.  The President is empowered 
through a procedural veto to send the draft legislation back to 
Parliament for reworking by Parliament in line with his concerns.   
The President exercised this procedural veto over the CAB in June 
2020, writing an 11-page referral letter detailing three constitutional 
                                                 
2 Copyright Act 98 of 1978 § 1(xxviii) (S. Afr.). 
3 Id. §§ 29-36. 
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reservations.4  As of July, Parliament is now dealing with the President’s 
letter and considering its options.  Most political activity is thus 
understandably focused on advocating for and against Parliament 
modifying or sending the Bill back to the President for his 
reconsideration.  This joint Parliamentary and Presidential process to 
consider the constitutionality of passed but not yet enacted legislation is 
one of the structural features of South African constitutional 
government.5 
 
When read closely and properly, the President’s letter sending the 
Bill back to Parliament states three reservations: one procedural and two 
substantive.  The President’s first reservation is a procedural one about 
tagging.  In paragraph 22.1 of his referral letter of 16 June 2020, the 
President wrote:  “I am of the view that the Bills have been incorrectly 
tagged and that they ought to have been classified and passed as section 
76 Bills.  This is primarily because their provisions have an impact on 
‘Trade’ and ‘Cultural matters’ as contemplated in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution.”  Section 75 outlines the ordinary process for passing 
national legislation, which was followed for the CAB. The section 76 
process is an exception which requires a more substantial role for the 
NCOP and the Provinces themselves for legislation that substantially 
affects the concurrent regulatory authority of the Provinces granted in the 
Constitution.  Notably, however, the Provinces do not have any such 
authority over intellectual property.   
Under the President’s overbroad interpretation any draft 
legislation that “impacts” trade or culture must follow section 76.  Thus, 
almost all bills of any significance would require special handling, and 
the NCOP’s carefully crafted constitutional role would be fundamentally 
changed.  Parliament is not bound by the President’s view of the 
legislative process.  Albeit in dialogue with the President through s 79, 
Parliament must work out for itself how to “tag” its bills and it can stick 
to its initial decision on classifying the CAB as a section 75 bill. 
Of particular relevance for this working paper, the President’s 
second reservation is a substantive one about the regulation of unfair 
contracts, overlapping with the issue of retrospectivity.  In paragraph 22.2 
of his referral letter of 16 June 2020, the President wrote:  “The 
retrospective application of the proposed new sections 6A, 7A, and 8A of 
the Copyright Bill to copyright assigned before the new sections come 
into operation may indeed be unconstitutional on the ground that it 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property under section 25 of the 
Constitution.” 
                                                 
4 Sean Flynn. South African President's Reservations to Copyright Bill Not Supported 
by Law. InfoJustice Blog (Jul. 13, 2010), http://infojustice.org/archives/42499 
5 Jonathan Klaaren, “Structures of Government in the 1996 South African Constitution: 
Putting Democracy Back Into Human Rights,” South African Journal on Human Rights 
13, no. 1 (January 1997): 3–27. 
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This reservation is an arguably serious one, yet, as detailed more 
fully below, it disregards an easily available interpretation of the CAB in 
which the Bill only regulates (1) unfair contracts and does so (2) only 
going forward.  This working paper argues that to the extent the current 
Bill language has any constitutional problem, it can be taken care of in 
the regulations to be drafted in the period preceding its coming into effect. 
The President’s third reservation is a substantive one about fair 
use.  In paragraph 22.3 of his referral letter of 16 June 2020, the President 
wrote:  “The new exceptions introduced by sections 12A, 12B, 12C, 12D, 
and 19B and 19C of the Copyright Bill are also likely to be declared 
unconstitutional on the basis that they are in breach of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution and the Three-Step test binding South Africa under 
international law.” 
While not directly relevant to this working paper, this reservation 
raises fascinating and far-reaching questions regarding the interaction of 
international and constitutional law in South Africa.   These widened 
copyright exceptions, favouring fair use and enhancing the role of 
libraries, are designed to make sure (for example) that contemporary 
creatives can quote parts of past works in making their own new ones, and 
that textbook publishers cannot price South African students out of the 
market.  The legal landscape is filled with such examples of reasonable 
limitations on private property for the good of the public.  As for the 
“Three-Step Test”, this international standard has not prevented other 
countries from enacting far-reaching copyright exceptions. There is no 
reason why this international standard should be applied more 
restrictively to South Africa through its own constitution. 
 
 
II. DRAFTING REGULATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL:  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF REGULATIONS 
 
Once the drama of section 79 consideration is over (and assuming that 
an amended Bill in some form is enacted), what might currently be 
considered an important sub-plot to the enactment process of the CAB 
will emerge as a full-blown storyline in its own right, one with true spin-
off potential.  While most attention is focused on the joint Presidential 
and Parliamentary consideration of the constitutionality of the Bill, work 
has already started on a further process that will need to unfold in order 
to bring the signed Bill (at that point an Act) into force – the drafting of 
regulations for the Copyright Amendment Act. 
Even once it is signed by the President, the amendment Act will need 
regulations to be drafted so as to be brought into force.  This necessity 
emerged dramatically in a case the Constitutional Court decided in 2000, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.6  This case is primarily known for 
                                                 
6 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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deciding the proposition that a court with the requisite jurisdiction has the 
power to review and set aside a decision by the President of South Africa 
to bring an Act of Parliament into force in terms of the principle of 
legality.  Perhaps negotiating the delicate political waters of a litigation 
process involving the Presidency, that case was decided on the basis of 
assumed error by government lawyers working for the Department of 
Health.7 
At a deeper level of detail than the availability of judicial review, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers also decided a number of threshold issues 
regarding the necessity of drafting regulations.  Since the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers decision, the South African government – working here 
through the Office of the State Attorney and the Office of the State Legal 
Advisor – has not been caught since with bringing an Act into force 
without the necessary regulations. 
The principal constitutional question here is when are regulations 
necessary for the implementation of an Act?  Regulations would, 
presumably, most of the time be helpful to the implementation of 
legislation, but when are they necessary?  According to the Constitutional 
Court, the question it faced was whether “the regulatory base necessary 
for the operation of the Act was not in place when [the President published 
a proclamation to bring the Act into force] because schedules had not been 
made to replace the repealed schedules of the 1965 Act, and other 
essential regulations contemplated by the Act had not been made”,8 ‘[t]he 
President’s decision to bring the Act into operation in such circumstances 
cannot be found to be objectively rational on any basis whatsoever”.9 The 
Court thus introduced three concepts:  the Act’s “regulatory base”, 
“essential regulations”, and other subordinate legislation beyond 
“essential regulations” – which in this case meant the schedules listing the 
drugs to be considered as medicines and those to be available for over-
the-counter dispensing.  The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Court did 
not pronounce on the question of the alleged missing essential regulations 
and instead decided the case on the basis – ultimately a farther-reaching 
basis – of the missing subordinate legislation beyond the regulation, the 
schedules.  
We should briefly canvass here two further constitutional matters that 
may extend the running time of the enactment movie.  First, as an 
authoritative and publicly available senior counsel opinion on the CAB, 
the Cowen et al. Opinion (para. 53 note 49), notes:  once the CAB is 
signed by the President and becomes an Act of Parliament, it is open to 
constitutional challenge in the ordinary course even before it comes into 
force, if a right has been infringed.10  A further point to articulate here is 
that the regulation drafting process may occur simultaneously with 
constitutional challenges to the legislation.  The precedent for such a 
constitutional challenge occurred in a public welfare context (the potential 
                                                 
7 Id. at 53-54 para.68. 
8 Id. at 5-6 para. 5. 
9 Id. at 68 para 89. 
10 See Susannah Cowen et al., Legal Opinion of Advocate Cowan (2019), https://www.re-
createza.org/legal-opinion-on-the-bill. 
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legislation exclusion of permanent residents from the extension of South 
Africa’s social security net). 11  A challenge to legislation before it comes 
into force and while regulations are being drafted would likely 
demonstrate the required standing and secure at least a hearing in court.  
In this scenario, the challenge to the Act would most likely be raised by 
interests sufficiently aggrieved by the legislation and desirous of an 
outcome whereby the legislation is struck down, changed, or delayed or 
even where the process of drafting regulations is either delayed, disrupted, 
or influenced by the simultaneous ongoing constitutional challenge to the 
empowering legislation. 
Another gateway to constitutional challenge that might extend the 
running time of the enactment movie is found in another section of the 
Constitution.  This section provides a limited supplementary or additional 
legislative role to a minority of the members of the first house of 
Parliament.  In terms of section 80, one-third of the members of the 
National Assembly may approach the Constitutional Court directly in 
respect of the constitutionality of an Act before it is brought into force.  
This route to a constitutional challenge to legislation has never been 
exercised since 1994.  One might imagine a scenario where agreement in 
Parliament to such an exercise would be a “quid pro quo” for Presidential 
signature.  In this case, the simultaneous process of drafting regulations 
might well be voluntarily paused, modified or delayed by government. 
 
III. DRAFTING REGULATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL:  
NEW PUBLIC LAW ISSUES 
 
With the above distinction of the sequel from its three related but 
earlier productions made in Section I and the constitutional issues 
explored in Section II, we turn now to the main show of this working 
paper – drafting regulations for the CAB.  Apart from the audiences built 
up by the earlier movies, why should cinema-goers care to look at the 
CAB from the point of view of drafting regulations?  Apart from the 
constitutional arguments in Section II, there are two reasons, one 
generally accepted and non-controversial and the second also significant 
but much less recognized. 
First, as is the case with most but not all legislation, the CAB must be 
accompanied by subordinate legislation (including here regulations) in 
order to be successfully implemented.  The necessity of subordinate 
legislation for the implementation of Parliamentary Acts has been a 
constant feature of the South African polity since the first decades of the 
20th century.  The necessity of such delegated public power was affirmed 
first in the post-apartheid era in the case of Executive Council of the 
Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South 
                                                 
11 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v 
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at 55-58 paras. 90-92 (S. Afr.); see also 
Max Du Plessis, Glenn Penfold, and Jason Brickhill, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (Juta 2013).  
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Africa and Others.12  Regulations are recognized as crucial for legislation.  
In one notable recent instance, draft regulations to the Carbon Tax Bill 
were drafted and made public while consideration of the Carbon Tax Bill 
was ongoing.  
In post-apartheid South Africa, the process of drafting regulations for 
implementation of an Act has often been fairly lengthy.  While there is 
apparently no comprehensive study available to provide a precise figure, 
the process of drafting regulations appears to take at least 6-12 months.  
A 2016 study of the Office of the State Legal Advisor shows that most of 
the drafting of legislation and regulations is done within line departments 
rather than undertaken in the specialist units of state lawyers.  This 
governmental lawyering unit did however report a 85% compliance rate 
in turning around within 40 days certifications of legislative instruments 
drafted elsewhere and submitted to the Office.13  The practice with 
legislative instruments administered by the dti seems to be for in-house 
drafting of subordinate legislation.14 
At this point, a new and directly relevant sub-plot emerges to our 
movie – the implementation of the CAB (once in force) through the 
drafting of regulations.  This new sub-plot relates to an earlier piece of 
dti- drafted and dti-administered piece of legislation, the Intellectual 
Property Law Amendment Act (Act. No. 28 of 2013) (IPLAA).  IPLAA 
introduces amendments that make traditional works (which include 
indigenous works) subject to copyright protection.  As is apparent from 
its title, this legislation has been enacted.  However, it has not yet been 
brought into effect.  The apparent reason that this Act from seven years 
ago has not been brought into effect is that its regulations have not yet 
been drafted.15  As currently drafted, IPLAA contains a reference to the 
Copyright Act.  Regarding this specific issue of the IPLAA, Cabinet 
currently understands that another piece of draft legislation, the 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems Bill, will remove the reference in the 
IPLAA to the Copyright Act. 
Again, here the dti is not necessarily out of line with relatively 
common South African government practice as a number of amendment 
bills across the state have become stuck in this stage and have never been 
brought into effect.  The Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008, 
administered by the Department of Home Affairs and brought into effect 
on 1 January 2020, twelve years after enactment, are a case in point.16   
Second, a less-usual function for subordinate legislation – 
interpretation interacting with the ongoing formulation and interpretation 
of the primary legislation -- is highlighted by the fact that the CAB has 
been considered by the Presidency to have serious concerns regarding its 
constitutionality and thus sent back to Parliament.  The President is in part 
                                                 
12 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
13 Jonathan Klaaren, Civil Government Lawyers in South Africa, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 365–77 (2016).  
14 There is scope here to research and draft a table on this issue. 
15 See Susannah Cowen, Jonathan Berger, and Mehluli Nxumalo, Opinion on CAB and the 
Constitution (2019), http://libguides.wits.ac.za/Copyright_and_Related_Issues/Opinion at para 
23. 
16   It may be worth further research to canvass the department’s IP Acts as a whole. 
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concerned that a plausible interpretation of the legislation would result in 
its unconstitutionality.  This concern would obviously need to be 
grounded in a specific substantive or procedural constitutional challenge.  
While arguable, and apparently not yet decided in the Constitutional 
Court, a concern of this sort arguably rises to the level of a serious and 
genuine doubt regarding constitutionality on the part of the President in 
terms of section 79.  It is a feature of the South African constitutional 
design that drafting of regulations may occur simultaneously with this 
process – this is why these legal issues may well be termed “new” public 
law issues. 
A tangential but nonetheless related situation occurs in the remedial 
phase of constitutional adjudication.  Due to the post-apartheid 
reconfiguration of the distribution of judicial and legislative control over 
statutes, there have been occasions for South African courts to consider 
draft legislation.  For instance, in a recent Constitutional Court argument 
regarding a SARS customs and search case, advocates used a draft 
amendment act in arguing the remedy already tabled.17  The Court 
referred approvingly to this use in its reasoning. 
What is highlighted by the above episode in the third movie is the 
element of continuity (really here, dynamic interaction) between that 
interpretive exercise (of the CAB) and the drafting of regulations.  In 
effect, it appears as if the CAB has been sent back for further legislative 
clarification (i.e. amendment) on some controversial parts in order to 
avoid unconstitutional interpretations.  This could be termed a “clarify 
and avoid” legal strategy as part of the section 79 consideration process. 
An earlier instance of this apparently occurred with the Protection of 
State Information Bill (B6 of 2010).  Ignoring major other issues of 
potential unconstitutionality, this Bill was first sent back by the 
Presidency under Jacob Zuma in 2013 on the basis that some relatively 
minor parts of the Bill were irrational and made in error and made no 
sense.  Arguably, there was an interpretation available to the Presidency 
and to Parliament that the version in fact could be interpreted in 
conformity with the Constitution on this point.  But the Parliament instead 
amended the draft legislation, correcting these errors, and sent it back to 
the Presidency (where it still remains).  While there are other plausible 
interpretations of this episode of constitutional politics at least one is the 
one sketched out above.  Indeed, the Presidency now appears to wish to 
essentially disregard this earlier referral and, in what it admits is an 
unprecedented situation, has in June 2020 referred the Protection of State 
Information Bill to Parliament a second time, but this time with serious 
reservations. 
On this theory, if all of some of the outstanding legitimate complaints 
about the CAB (either complaints of policy or of legislative interpretation 
running afoul of the Constitution) can be addressed by draft regulations, 
then this demonstration of and commitment to a specific interpretation of 
the Bill may give the President the space he needs to sign the Bill and 
                                                 
17 Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others 2014 (1) SA 442 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
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allow the regulation process to move forward.  Within the bounds of the 
Constitution, promises can be made to “fix problems” in the regulations 
or commitments undertaken to (or tactics embarked upon) to delay hard 
questions to the regulations.  Without question, this argument may in 
some instances be taken too far.  For instance, a survey of existing 
Copyright Act subordinate legislation and necessary changes and addition 
prompted by the CAB might theoretically provide an argument relevant 
to the tagging argument in the third movie (enactment).18  This may be a 
step too far for South African legal culture.  There is much more to say 
here but that is another production. 
 
IV. DRAFTING REGULATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL:  
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS FOR STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND REGULATORY DRAFTING 
 
As most legal practitioners and scholars realize, regulations 
implement principal legislation and often become just as if not more 
significant to persons, firms, and industries working with the primary 
legislation.  Regulations can structure further levels of implementation 
including guidance documents.  One example might be a “Guide to Best 
Practices in Fair Use” for certain sectors of the creative industries.  Such 
guidance documents may be drafted on private or government initiative.19  
There exists to some extent a current debate in South African 
administrative law over whether or not interpretations of primary 
legislation relied upon by implementing bureaucrats and relatively 
longstanding may be given any interpretative weight due to that fact.20  
There is no South African doctrine parallel to the American Chevron 
interpretation.  In part due to these features and to their potential impact, 
regulatory drafting process can be just as contested as the legislative 
drafting process and perhaps more so. 
The Chevron question has, however, recently appeared in the 
Constitutional Court.  In Marshall (see note 19) , with the pleadings 
closed, the Chief Justice issued directions dated 22 November 2017, inter 
alia, inviting the parties within defined timelines to file written 
submissions on: “the extent to which a court may consider or defer to an 
administrative body’s interpretation of legislation, such as [the 
Interpretation Note] and whether [the SCA’s] approach was in accordance 
with this”.  As confirmed in CSAR v Bosch, South African practice had 
been to use such documents if uncontested as tipping pieces of evidence 
                                                 
18 Cowen et al., supra note 8, at paras. 83.1 and 87.  
19 AAA Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Another 2007 
(1) SA 343 (CC) (S. Afr.) (regulations drafted by a private body considered as PAJA 
administrative action). 
20  See inter alia Allison Anthony, Administrative Justice Association of South Africa (AdjASA) 
Conference 2019: Administrative Justice in and Beyond the Courts (Mar. 5-6, 2019); see also 
Marshall and Others v Commission for the South Africa Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). 
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in marginal cases of statutory interpretation.21  This practice began with 
the pro-plaintiff decision of R v Detody, which confirmed the non-
application of segregationist pass laws to women in 1926.22   Strikingly, 
a unanimous Constitutional Court reconsidered and nearly overturned this 
theme of statutory interpretation, even in the face of its consistency with 
Endumeni.23  The reasoning of the Court in Marshall was such:  
 [9] The rule thus originated in the context of legislative 
supremacy where statutory interpretation was aimed at 
ascertaining the intention of the legislature.  In that particular 
context custom could “tip the balance” in cases of ambiguous 
legislation. Bosch recognised that the rule had to be adapted to 
contextual statutory interpretation.  The rationale for relying on 
consistent interpretation by those responsible for the 
administration of legislation also changed from “custom” to the 
assistance that could be gained from their evidence in determining 
“the meaning that should reasonably be placed upon those words”.  
[10] Missing from this reformulation is any explicit mention 
of a further fundamental contextual change, that from legislative 
supremacy to constitutional democracy.  Why should a unilateral 
practice of one part of the executive arm of government play a role 
in the determination of the reasonable meaning to be given to a 
statutory provision?  It might conceivably be justified where the 
practice is evidence of an impartial application of a custom 
recognised by all concerned, but not where the practice is 
unilaterally established by one of the litigating parties.  In those 
circumstances it is difficult to see what advantage evidence of the 
unilateral practice will have for the objective and independent 
interpretation by the courts of the meaning of legislation, in 
accordance with constitutionally compliant precepts.  It is best 
avoided.”24 
 
This section covers two major topics:  the current South African law 
on legal interpretation (including statutory interpretation) and the current 
South African law on regulatory drafting. 
To begin with the first, as has become clear, the 2012 case of 
Endumeni Municipality fundamentally changed and replaced the pre-
existing paradigm of legal interpretation in South Africa.  Interpretation 
may be defined as ‘process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or 
contract’.25  Endumeni effected its revolution by challenging as a fiction 
                                                 
21 Bosch and Another v Commissioner of South African Revenue Services (A 94/2012) 
[2012] ZAWCHC 188; [2013] 2 All SA 41 (WCC); 2013 (5) SA 130 (WCC) (20 
November 2012). 
22 Rex v Detody 1926 AD 198. 
23 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
24 Marshall and Others v Commission for the South Africa Revenue Service 2019 (6) SA 246 (CC) 
at 5-6 paras. 9-10 (S. Afr.). 
25 Supra note 20, at para. 18. 
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the concept underlying the pre-existing approach, the notion of a 
discoverable and coherent intention of the legislature (or other drafting 
institution) that passed the statute (or other legal instrument).  As Wallis 
J wrote:  ‘[T]here is no such thing as the intention of the legislature in 
relation to the meaning of specific provisions in a statute, particularly as 
they may fall to be interpreted in circumstances that were not present to 
the minds of those involved in their preparation. Accordingly to 
characterise the task of interpretation as a search for such an ephemeral 
and possibly chimerical meaning is unrealistic and misleading.’26  
The previous approach could be found in the 1995 case of Coopers & 
Lybrand v Bryant, decided by the Appellate Division under the interim 
Constitution.27  Here, the proper approach to interpretation was 
summarised as being that one should first "ascertain the literal meaning 
of the words" and thereafter have regard to context and background 
circumstances, applying extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances 
when encountering ambiguity.28  Decided 17 years after Coopers & 
Lybrand, Endumeni Municipality may be understood as the culmination 
of a gradual shift away from a literal process of interpreting contracts and 
statutes to one where both text and context have a role to play. 
There is little doubt that Endumeni Municipality has now become the 
dominant text in South African legal interpretation.  A recent 
Constitutional Court judgement, ACSA v Big Five, confirms and 
exemplifies the trendline of the past 8 years.  There the Court noted that 
in the litigation before it, “[t]here is no dispute about the principles of 
interpretation.  The correct approach to the interpretation of documents 
was summarised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Endumeni 
Municipality:   
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the 
words used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory 
instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by 
reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the 
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its 
coming into existence.  Whatever the nature of the document, 
consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the 
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and 
the material known to those responsible for its production.  Where 
more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be 
weighed in the light of all these factors.  The process is objective, 
not subjective.  A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that 
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the 
apparent purpose of the document.  Judges must be alert to, and 
guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as 
reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually 
used.  To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to 
                                                 
26 Id. at para. 21. 
27 1995 (3) SA 761 (AD). 
28 Id at 768 A-E. 
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cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a 
contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other 
than the one they in fact made.  The ‘inevitable point of departure 
is the language of the provision itself’, read in context and having 
regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the 
preparation and production of the document.” 
 
In a legal academic article published in the Pochefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal, the authoring judge of Endumeni Municipality, Malcolm 
Wallis, a judge on the Supreme Court of Appeal, has written on the topic 
of ‘Interpretation Before and After National Joint Municipal Pension 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA).’29    Wallis makes 
several points relevant to the content, spirit, and application of the new 
Endumeni legal interpretation paradigm.  First, consistent with the gradual 
shift away from a literal interpretation, Wallis notes that both text and 
context have a role to play, and which will predominate will depend on 
the circumstances of each case.30   Second, he notes two of the principles 
underlying Endumeni.31  First, Endumeni demands of judges that they 
articulate their reasons, both linguistic and contextual, for arriving at their 
decisions on questions of the construction of documents. Second, it is 
desirable to have a single reasonably clear standard for the interpretation 
of documents that enables lawyers and courts to go about their business 
of interpreting documents, without becoming bogged down in the "how" 
of interpretation.  Third, Wallis observes that “[s]tatutes directed at 
ameliorating a distinct social problem are entitled to a more generous 
construction, given that purpose, than a technical regulatory statute such 
as the Companies Act.”32  Fourth, Wallis observes that Endumeni by no 
means represents a rolling back of the movement towards allowing 
reference to parliamentary drafting materials in the interpretation of 
statutes.  “Legislative history is another source of relevant context that 
can be of great assistance in resolving problems of interpretation and can 
on occasions prove decisive in clarifying what is otherwise obscure.”33  
As he notes, “[t]he explanatory memorandum prepared by the committee 
that drafted the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 has been referred to on 
countless occasions as providing relevant context to the provisions of the 
LRA.”34  Wallis is here drawing on a context of English and South 
African law.  The rule against the admissibility of parliamentary materials 
has (controversially) been abolished in England.35 
The above observations may imply several propositions particularly 
relevant to the interpretation of the amended Copyright Act.  First, the 
                                                 
29 Malcolm Wallis, Interpretation Before and After Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v 
Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA), POCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC LAW JOURNAL (2019). 
30 Id. at 8. 
31 Id. at 21-22. 
32 Id. at 17. 
33 Id. at 18. 
34 Id. 
35 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (HL) (noting that it is not yet 
authoritative in South Africa (citing S v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 7-9 
paras. 14-15)). 
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third observation made by Wallis implies that we should make a 
distinction between two of the principal purposes of the amended Act:  the 
“feed the starving artists” purpose (e.g. redistribution within the creative 
industries) and the purpose to introduce fair use within the copyright 
regulatory regime (more technical).  A more generous construction may 
be attributed to provisions reflective of the first purpose.  Second, the 
fourth observation made by Wallis confirms that an explanatory 
memorandum to accompany the regulation drafting process may be 
worthwhile.  Further, it indicates that existing parliamentary materials 
(such as the explanatory memorandum for the Copyright Amendment 
Act) are worth engaging with at level of statutory interpretation as well as 
at level of regulatory drafting.  Fifth, Wallis observes that as important 
element of interpretation is to consider the statute as a whole.  Here, “the 
provisions of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 operate as interpretative 
guides in certain situations, and section 39(2) of the Constitution contains 
the injunction that legislation must be interpreted in accordance with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”36  Sixth, although South 
Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention, section 233 of the 
Constitution requires courts where possible to construe all law in 
accordance with international law.37  Seventh, Wallis makes a final 
observation about the place of social content and particularly commercial 
context in legal interpretation.  Here, Wallis appears to be distancing 
himself from a call for interpretation in line with commercial sensibility.  
He is careful to state “… commercial sensibility … is an expression to be 
found in the English judgments, which focus particularly on commercial 
contracts. It is not an expression used in Endumeni. What I said was that 
a sensible construction was to be preferred to one that was insensible or 
unbusinesslike. And provided judges heed the warning that followed, that 
it is not for them to impose their personal sense of what would be sensible 
or desirable in place of what the parties to the contract or the legislative 
body have actually said, this should not be problematic.  …. When one 
speaks of a contract being unbusinesslike, the danger of course lies in 
failing to resist the temptation to rescue one party from the consequences 
of a bad bargain, but I would have thought that it was clear that this is not 
the judicial role.”38   
To move to the second topic of this section, the legal doctrines 
relevant to drafting regulations in South Africa are nearly all derived from 
instances of judicial review.  And many do not originate in cases of 
regulations but instead derive from judicial review of exercises of 
discretion.  Perhaps the primary example is the case of Dawood.  In that 
early Constitutional Court case, the court held that legislatures cannot 
grant unfettered discretion to administrator and must provide at least some 
minimal guidelines.  This constitutional holding aligns well with the usual 
practice of statutory interpretation in judicial review holding that a 
legislature (e.g. Parliament) may frame an administrative power given in 
a statute widely or narrowly.  This is referred to as a wide or a narrow 
                                                 
36 Wallis, supra note 26, at 18. 
37 Id. at 19. 
38 Id. at 19-20. 
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discretion – e.g. the breadth of the discretion allowed to the administrator 
to exercise.  Statutes with narrow discretions are often detailed and 
technical, providing sufficient statutory textual fodder for reviewing 
courts to ascertain a standard against which to measure administrative 
action.  [It may be worth reviewing the cases interpreting the Copyright 
Act to date; presumably they mostly concern exercises of discretion.] 
Despite the lack of decided cases specifically considering the drafting 
of regulations, it effectively certain that regulatory interpretation will 
follow Endumeni.  In a case decided around the same time as Endumeni, 
the Constitutional Court reversed another decision of the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, attempting to find and articulate the same balance between text 
and context that Wallis has articulated in Endumeni:  “… Although a 
number of factors need to be considered in this kind of enquiry, the central 
element is to link the question of compliance to the purpose of the 
provision.  In this Court, O’Regan J succinctly put the question in ACDP 
v Electoral Commission as being “whether what the applicant did 
constituted compliance with the statutory provisions viewed in the light 
of their purpose”.  This is not the same as asking whether compliance with 
the provisions will lead to a different result.”39   
As background, the making of regulations (e.g. the unified process of 
their drafting and their promulgation) is best considered as satisfying the 
definition of administrative action in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act and thus needs to satisfy the legal 
requirements incorporated in that legislation – which itself largely 
implements the content of section 33 in the Constitution, the right of just 
administrative action.  Even if the making of regulations were not to be 
considered administrative action, the doctrines below would most likely 
apply as a matter of the principle of legality.40  There is no recognized 
general South African law requiring regulations to undergo a process of 
notice and comment – instead, there may be specific participation 
processes specified in the primary legislation.  Further, a process akin to 
notice and comment is a discretionary option that may be undertaken by 
the drafter of the regulations in terms of PAJA section 4.  
Given the above understanding, we can formulate, as a working 
framework, five legal doctrines that both empower and constrain drafting 
regulations for the amended Copyright Act.  First, regulations must be 
intra vires their empowering legislation or other empowering legal 
instrument.41  In elaborating upon this doctrine, one rule of construction 
is that the words of a regulation made under powers derived from a statute 
cannot be relied upon as an aid to the construction of the statute itself.  
                                                 
39 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency and Others 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) at 17-18 para. 30 (S. 
Afr.). 
40 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council and Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
41 See University of Cape Town v Minister of Education & Culture 1988 (3) SA 203 (CC); see also 
Municipal Employees Pension Fund v Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) and 
Others 2018 (2) BCLR 157 (CC) at 34-35 paras. 89-92 (S. Afr.). 
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Second, regulations, like other laws, must be written in a clear and 
accessible manner.42  According to the Constitutional Court, “[t]he 
doctrine of vagueness is founded on the rule of law, which … is a 
foundational value of our constitutional democracy. It requires that laws 
must be written in a clear and accessible manner.  What is required is 
reasonable certainty and not perfect lucidity.  The doctrine of vagueness 
does not require absolute certainty of laws. The law must indicate with 
reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it what is required of them 
so that they may regulate their conduct accordingly.  The doctrine of 
vagueness must recognise the role of government to further legitimate 
social and economic objectives. And should not be used unduly to impede 
or prevent the furtherance of such objectives.” (footnotes omitted). 
Third, regulations must not be based on errors of law.43  On 
recommendation from the Private Industry Security Regulatory 
Authority, the Minister of Police amended regulations with the effect that 
firms in the security industry would need to pay some security guards 
more.44  These firms objected.  The threshold issue of administrative 
action was determined to be clear.45  While the Authority had complied 
with the participation process in the empowering legislation, the firms 
objected that the consultation was mechanical.46  More significantly, they 
also claimed that the Authority was materially influenced by an error of 
law in understanding regulations could not differentiate between large and 
small firms.47  The reviewing court agreed with the firms.  The legal 
interpretive error was that the regulations could differentiate – see Act 
section 35(2):  “Different regulations may be made in terms of subsection 
(1) with reference to different categories or classes of security service 
providers.”  The evidence of the view of the Authority was in Authority’s 
“analysis of comments”.48  The statutory interpretation exercise shows 
“contrary to the view conveyed to the Minister by the Authority that 
current legislation did not permit it to classify businesses by size or 
income in order to arrive a differentiated fees, it was so permitted.”49  
Fourth, regulations must be rational.  The controlling test in this area 
of SA administrative law may be stated as: “is there a rational objective 
basis justifying the connection made by the administrative decision-
maker between the material properly available to him and the conclusion 
he or she eventually arrived at.”50  In renewing a station community 
broadcasting license but refusing to extend its area beyond legacy Ciskei 
and Transkei to the city of Port Elizabeth, it was rational for the 
telecommunications regulator to consider the then-current absence of 
                                                 
42 Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) 
at 55-56 para. 108 (S. Afr.). 
43 Security Industry Alliance v Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others 2015 
(1) SA 169 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
44 Id. at paras. 4-5. 
45 Id. at para. 15. 
46 Id. at para. 17. 
47 Id. at para. 18. 
48 Id. at para. 19. 
49 Id. at para. 25. 
50 Trinity Broadcasting, Ciskei v Independent Communications Authority of SA 2003 (4) All SA 
589 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
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broadcasting policy and to wish to maintain a level playing field in areas 
such as Port Elizabeth.  However, it was not rational for the regulator to 
impose license condition of 20% iXhosa and 20% Afrikaans language 
content quotas in total when the only information supporting this was 
applicant’s undertaking to provide 20% iXhosa and 20% Afrikaans of the 
local content (which was 25% of the total content). 
Fifth, regulations must be proportionate and reasonable.51  In this 
case, regulations presumptively prohibiting use of off-road vehicles on 
beaches were challenged but found not to be unreasonable because of 
various and wide-ranging automatic exemptions. 
 
V. DRAFTING REGULATIONS FOR THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL:  
SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES 
 
In order to produce and draft the regulations for the CAB, we need to 
consult with and to some extent consolidate four sets of texts and 
doctrines (four scripts).  These are first (and most significant) the text of 
the Copyright Act, as amended by the CAB.  This text has not yet been 
produced or finalized but can, for current purposes, be read from the texts 
of current Act and the Bill.  This set of texts also includes other 
parliamentary materials, such as the explanatory memorandum to the Bill.  
The second set of texts and doctrines is the case of Endumeni and related 
cases, which enunciates a new South African paradigm of statutory 
interpretation (this has been covered above in section four). The third is 
a set of cases and doctrines (mostly consisting of instances of judicial 
review) that provide some clear parameters for South Africa regulatory 
drafting (this has been covered above in section four).  The fourth set is 
the set of the Copyright Regulations and any other current subordinate 
legislation to the Copyright Act.  These regulations and notices are the 
hard sub-statutory law that the regulations to be drafted will supplement, 
replace and incorporate or change, or repeal. 
In relation to the Copyright Act (as amended), the first question is to 
identify which provisions of the amended Act need regulations either in 
order to have effective implementation or to clarify and avoid 
controversial substantive constitutional questions.  Here, there are four 
primary provisions which are controversial.  In each of these four areas in 
different ways, draft regulations can potentially alleviate constitutional 
concerns.  First, the creator royalty sharing provisions (sections 5A-9A) 
are claimed to violate the right to property.  As explored further below, 
the role that draft regulations may play here is both to clarify and avoid a 
plausible interpretation of the amended Act that would be unconstitutional 
(as explored below) and to supplement the amended Act:  creating a 
constitutionally-compliant institution to resolve disputes between creators 
and rights-holders regarding these royalties.  Second, the fair use 
provisions (section 12A) are claimed to violate the right to property.  The 
                                                 
51 SA Shore Angling Association v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2002 ZAECHC 
12 (S. Afr.). 
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role that draft regulations may play here is to clarify that that the 
implementation and operation of fair use is constitutionally compliant.  
Third, the creator reversion provisions (section 22) are claimed to violate 
the right to property.  In relation to these provisions, the draft regulations 
can also clarify and avoid a plausible interpretation of the amended Act 
that would be unconstitutional (as explored below).  Finally, the amended 
Act has a significant different enforcement mechanism from the original 
1978 Act, featuring an expanded role of the Copyright Tribunal (section 
29).  Here, draft regulations can update and extend the existing regulations 
allowing the Tribunal to operate.  While this is not an area of direct 
constitutional concern, an oft-stated concern with the amended Act as a 
whole is that it attempts to strike a balance between creator and rights-
holders interests but does not have the tools to finely assess or calibrate 
that balance in cases where either creators or rights-holders are refusing 
to cooperate in the process of negotiation. 
 We can turn briefly now to the existing regulations to the 
Copyright Act.  Unfortunately, there is no South African government 
documentation that consolidates into one text all currently existing 
regulations for an Act.  The original set of regulations to the Copyright 
Act is contained in Government Notice no. R2530 in Government Gazette 
no. 6252 of 22 December 1978 (in operation since 1 January 1979) (the 
1979 regulations).  These have been supplemented by several further 
pieces of regulations.. The 1979 regulations are organized into five 
chapters.  Chapter 1 covers reproduction regulations.  These regulations 
will need to be revised in light of the fair use provisions of the amended 
Act.  Chapter 2 covers sound recording royalties.  This chapter may serve 
as a starting point for the extension of royalties to creators in other sectors 
beyond music and sound recording.  Chapter 3 covers authors of 
cinematograph films.  Chapter 4 provides the Copyright Tribunal 
Regulations.  This chapter will require revision in light of the extensive 
changes to the Tribunal in the amended Act.  Chapter 5 covers some 
miscellaneous topics. 
While it is not a necessary golden thread that needs to be woven 
between a regulation drafting initiative and a legal opinion on the 
constitutionality of the CAB, this working paper adopts for purposes of 
consistency the statutory interpretation of the purposes of the Copyright 
Act Bill (which is of course distinct from the analysis of the amended Act) 
from that opinion.  Cowen et al. have identified six purposes to the Bill 
(Opinion para 27).  These are:  (1) to modernize South African copyright 
law and update the 1978 Act, including to bring our legislation in line 
with the needs of the fast-evolving digital age; (2) to bring South African 
law in line with international standards and to implement the content of 
international treaties relating to copyright (both those to which South 
Africa is already a party and those it intends to accede to); (3) to promote 
socio-economic development and poverty reduction, innovation and a 
knowledge economy in the interests of all South Africans; (4) to balance 
the need to incentivize creativity and knowledge development with the 
need to facilitate access to works in the public interest; (5) to protect and 
advance the interests of authors and creators; (6) to promote the rights of 
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others including the right of access to education and the right to equality 
especially to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.  The fifth and 
the sixth of these purposes would seem at first blush to fall within the 
category identified by Wallis as ones to be applied generously. 
Continuing the theme of a golden thread, it may be worth making a 
comment on the element of continuity.  For instance, as discussed in the 
Cowen et al. Opinion (paras. 137-138), a constitutional concern has been 
expressed that the CAB impermissibly delegates powers to the Minister 
of Trade and Industry to make regulations in respect of sections 6A(7)(b), 
7A(7)(b), and8A(5)(b).  This is countered by Cowen et al. (paras. 139-
145).  There is some doctrinal and interpretative overlap here with the 
regulatory making power.  The SA doctrine of appellate estoppel that 
enforces this sort of consistency was expressed in Municipal Employees 
Pension Fund v Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Superannuation) 
and Others (April 8, 2017) (Constitutional Court). 
The date on which the President signs the CAB into law as an 
amendment to the Copyright Act is different from the date on which the 
amendments themselves will come into force.  As noted in Cowen at al. 
Opinion, page 25, at note 49, in terms of section 38(1) the CAB comes 
into force on a date to be fixed by the President by proclamation in the 
Gazette.  The amendments may be brought into force on diverse dates, as 
is common practice in South Africa.  As is also common practice, there is 
no statutory provision for a specific date or process for the general CAB 
regulations to come into force. 
In the CAB, there are two different processes legislated for drafting 
regulations depending on the subject matter of the regulations.  This may 
contribute to different regulations coming into effect on different dates.  
The general process for regulations is specified and governed by section 
38(1) for the regulations required to put the CAB amendments into force.  
In terms of this general process for regulations, the CAB (clause 33 
amending section 39 of the Act) requires that “[b]efore making any 
regulations in terms of subsection (1), the Minister must publish the 
proposed regulations for public comment for a period of not less than 30 
days.”  The CAB is adding this procedural requirement as the Copyright 
Act currently has no general 30-day public comment requirement.  
Further, there is no requirement for different regulations to be brought 
into effect at the same time. 
A supplemental set of additional requirements to the regulation 
drafting process is identified in clauses 5 (inserting section 6A(7)), 7 
(inserting section 7A(7)) and 9 (inserting section 8A(5)) of the CAB 
regarding the creator royalty regulations.  At issue in these sections is the 
right of the author of a copyrighted work to share in royalties in respect 
of literacy or musical works, visual artistic works, and audio-visual 
works.  For regulations dealing with this subject matter, the drafting will 
be in two parts.  First, the Minister must develop (a) draft regulations 
setting out the process to give effect to the application of each section to 
eligible works; (b) conduct an impact assessment of the proposed process; 
and (c) table the draft regulations and impact assessment in the National 
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Assembly (one of the houses of Parliament).  Second, once this first 
process is complete, the Minister may then make these regulations 
through the Act’s usual section 39 regulation process.  There is 
considerable scope here for interpretation, as well as for considering the 
interaction of this process with the PAJA.  The creator royalty regulations 
are thus subject to two instances of public comment and should be 
specifically considered for approval by the National Assembly. 
The usual practice for statutory definition of regulation-making 
powers in South Africa is to list specific matters for which regulations can 
be made (sometimes with specific consultation requirements such as with 
the Minister of Finance), as well as to enact a non-specific regulation-
making power (e.g. “The Minister may make regulations as to any matter 
required or permitted by this Act to be prescribed by regulations.”) as well 
as often a general incidental regulation-making power (e.g. “The Minister 
may make regulations generally, as to any matter which he considers it 
necessary or expedient to prescribe in order that the purposes of this Act 
may be achieved.”).  The Copyright Act currently adopts this structure 
and the amendments of the CAB work within that structure. 
In its clause 33, the CAB adds specific regulation-making powers in 
five areas, amending section 39 of the Act.  The first area is strengthening 
the Tribunal:  “(cF) prescribing rules regulating the processes and 
proceedings of the Tribunal.”  The second area includes regulations 
covering both the controversial areas of creator royalty rights and 
reversion rights:  “(cG)  prescribing compulsory and standard contractual 
terms to be included in agreements to be entered in terms of this Act.”  
The third area is one not discussed in this working paper, technological 
protection measures:  “(cH)  prescribing permitted acts for circumvention 
of technological protection measures contemplated in section 28B after 
due consideration of the following factors.”  These regulations may only 
be made “after due consideration of the following factors:  (i)  The 
availability for use of works protected by copyright; (ii)  the availability 
for use of works for non-profit archival and educational purposes;  
(iii)  the impact of the prohibition on the circumvention of technological 
protection measures applied to works or protected by copyright on 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research; or 
(iv)  the effect of the circumvention of technological protection measures 
on the market for or value of works protected by copyright.”  The fourth 
area is royalty rates:  “(cI)  prescribing royalty rates or tariffs for various 
forms of use.” The fifth area is also not one discussed in this working 
paper, regulating the distribution and collection processes of the 
collecting societies:  “(cJ)  prescribing the percentage and period within 
which distribution of royalties must be made by collecting societies” and 
“(cK)  prescribing the terms and manner relating to the management of 
unclaimed royalties, code of conduct and any other matter relating to the 
reporting, operations, activities and better collection processes of 
royalties by a collecting society.” 
We focus here on the overlapping second and fourth areas of 
competence for drafting regulations.  These regulations include within 
their subject matter two key innovations of the CAB:  both the 
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controversial additional creator royalty rights in the CAB (amended 
section 6 (literary or musical works), section 7 (visual artistic works), 
section 8 (audiovisual works), and section 9 (sound recordings)) and the 
controversial reversion right in the CAB (clause 23 amending section 
22(3) of the Act).  The Cowen et al. Opinion did not consider the new 
section 22(3) reversion right nor is s 22(3) strictly speaking part of the 
President’s reservations but s 22(3) was mentioned in passing in the 
President’s referral letter. 
The insertion of new sections 6A, 7A and 8A into the Act will mean 
that authors of literary, musical or visual works have an inalienable right 
to a fair royalty on the exploitation of their work.   These sections operate 
both in respect of works where the right to royalties has already been 
assigned and in respect of works where the right to royalties has yet to be 
assigned.  In respect of the first category of works, the insertion of the 
sections does have an impact on past transactions in that they impose new 
terms and obligations on the parties to any contract dealing with the 
assignment of royalties.52 
There are arguably two readings for the new sections 6A, 7A, and 8A.  
In one reading, these sections apply only to works with unfair royalties.  
This is an interpretation without constitutional concerns.  In a second 
reading, the new sections can be read to apply to all works.  This is an 
interpretation arguably with constitutional concerns, regarding the 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to property.   
There are two readings of the new section 22(3).  In one reading, it 
can be read as prospective only.  This is an interpretation without 
constitutional concerns.  In a second reading, it can be read 
retrospectively.  This is an interpretation arguably with constitutional 
concerns, regarding the arbitrary deprivation of the right to property. 
There are at least three potential routes drawing upon the regulatory 
drafting function to alleviate the arguable constitutional concern.  One 
route is to explicitly adopt the prospective interpretation of section 22(3) 
in the regulations.  This would directly address any plausible issue of 
unconstitutionality and is perhaps the best option.  A second route is to 
use the regulations to limit the category of holders of the reversion right.  
For instance, extras in audiovisual works could be defined not to be 
holders of the reversion right in section 22(3).  A third route would be to 
specify for enforcement a non-intrusive form of the reversion right.  For 
instance, extras holding a reversion right might be limited to satisfaction 
of that right only through compensation, eliminating the potential for a 
provision that might holdup the production of the audiovisual work. 
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Amendment Bill and the Constitution,” October 13, 2019, paras. 133–135. 
